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DEAL MOMENTUM
Cathy Hwang*
65 UCLA LAW REVIEW ___ (forthcoming 2018)
ABSTRACT
Why do parties use non-binding agreements? This Article explores the role of nonbinding preliminary agreements in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals. It provides a
modern, comprehensive account of how and why sophisticated parties use these common
bargaining tools, even when they have the option of using binding contracts.
In M&A deals, parties enter into non-binding preliminary agreements, such as term
sheets and letters of intent. Once parties sign a non-binding agreement, they behave as
though bound and almost always follow up with a formal contract with terms that closely
resemble the non-binding agreement’s terms. Scholars and courts have long treated
preliminary agreements as contract-like tools that parties will enforce when counterparties
breach. This Article develops an alternative explanation for why parties use non-binding
preliminary agreements. These agreements are not contracts—rather, they are signposts for
when enough momentum has accumulated that a deal has become “sticky” and is likely to
go forward. Although non-binding preliminary agreements are not contracts, their signaling,
organizational, and formal functions can facilitate complex dealmaking.
Using interviews with deal lawyers, this Article provides a rich and layered account of
how sophisticated parties use these agreements in modern dealmaking. Parties almost never
disclose non-binding preliminary agreements publicly, so interviews offer a rare glimpse into
this common, but little-understood, deal practice. This Article also differentiates, for the
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first time, between the formal and substantive functions of preliminary agreement-making.
By focusing exclusively on these agreements’ contractual qualities (their substantive
functions), scholars have overlooked their useful formal functions. By reframing preliminary
agreements as signposts for deal momentum, rather than as contracts, this Article highlights
those functions, and discusses the implications of this reframing for contract theory, contract
enforcement, and deal design.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court awarded $113 million in
expectation damages when a sophisticated party did not honor the terms of
an unsigned, two-page preliminary agreement marked “non-binding.”1 Over
a ten-year battle, the Delaware courts’ four decisions in SIGA Technologies Inc.
v. PharmAthene Inc. stirred up a storm of interest from deal lawyers.2 They also
brought to light a long-standing and puzzling practice in dealmaking: the use
of non-binding agreements. Why do parties use non-binding agreements to
memorialize high-stakes deals, especially when they have the option to use
formal, binding contracts?
Much of contract law scholarship has focused on questions of
enforcement after a contract is breached. The ability to sue and recover
damages for breach of contract ex post is understood as a way to motivate
party behavior ex ante. In the absence of formal enforcement, informal
1.
SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 132 A.3d 1108 (Del. 2015); SIGA
Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330 (Del. 2013).
2.
See, e.g., Andrew J. Colosimo et al., Practice Points for Term Sheets, Letters of Intent,
and Undertakings to Negotiate in Good Faith—Based on Delaware Supreme Court’s SIGA Decision,
FRIED FRANK: PRIVATE EQUITY BRIEFING 1 (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.friedfrank.com
[https://perma.cc/ZVZ8-89BS] (emphasizing “the importance of clarity in a term sheet or
letter of intent with respect to whether there is a binding obligation to negotiate in good faith
and what the scope of that obligation is”); Patrick Klingborg, When a “Non-Binding” Letter of
Intent Is Binding After All, LINCOLN, GUSTAFSON, & CERCOS, LLP (June 1, 2016),
http://www.lgclawoffice.com [https://perma.cc/D84X-3F5C] (noting that Delaware’s
decision in SIGA was “different from the California approach” and that “[t]he best practice,
therefore, is to be sure a letter of intent accurately characterizes what you intend to negotiate
in good faith regardless of whether the letter of intent states it is ‘non-binding’”); Philip
Richter, Negotiation in Good Faith—SIGA v. PharmAthene, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 27, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/27/negotiation-in-good-faith-siga-v-pharmathene
[https://perma.cc/HNM6-CM89] (“Based on SIGA, as a practical matter, expectation
damages will now be a real possibility in Delaware for breaches of agreements to negotiate in
good faith.”); Ropes & Gray LLP, Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Award of Expectation Damages
in Breach of Contract Claim, THE ROPES RECAP: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS LAW NEWS 10, 11
(4th Qtr. 2015), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2016/February/The-RopesRecap-Mergers-Acquisitions-Law-News.aspx [https://perma.cc/GG7D-G4Q9] (describing
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in SIGA and the history of the case, and noting that
in a dissent, Justice Valihura noted that the majority’s decision “would move Delaware out of
alignment with other major commercial jurisdictions . . . by eroding the requirement that
damages be proved with reasonable certainty”).
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enforcement, such as damage to one’s reputation, can also motivate deal
parties to play by the rules.3 What little scholarship exists about preliminary
agreements also focuses on enforcement. Scholars have debated, for
instance, whether a preliminary agreement (even if unsigned and marked nonbinding, and not meeting the formal definition of a contract) creates a legal
obligation to perform, and if so, whether breaching parties should be liable
for reliance or expectation damages.4
But to understand whether and how to enforce preliminary agreements,
we must first address fundamental questions: Why do sophisticated parties
use non-binding preliminary agreements at all? And, if these agreements are
not binding, why do deal parties abide by their terms?
This Article begins the inquiry from the perspective of contract design,5
rather than enforcement, to understand the role of preliminary agreements in
dealmaking.
3.
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law] (explaining that reputation-based nonlegal sanctions create
a powerful enforcement mechanism, essential to the function of the private legal system
created by the cotton industry); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Opting Out] (describing trade association enforcement of contractual breaches);
Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry,
5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989) [hereinafter Ellickson, A Hypothesis] (presenting evidence of
informal enforcement—norms—overtaking formal enforcement in the whaling industry);
Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986) [hereinafter Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle] (describing how rural
cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, abide by norms rather than rules, and how
animal trespass disputes are settled by self-help, rather than formal legal enforcement
mechanisms); W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement, 45 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 595 (2007) (describing the use of informal enforcement to police
contract defaults).
4.
See Richter, supra note 2 (“In SIGA’s case, a damages award based on reliance
would have led to a far better economic result than it would have received from entering into
the license agreement on the contemplated terms. The real potential in Delaware
for expectation damages for breach of an obligation to negotiate an agreement in good faith
should change the calculus for a party considering whether to breach this type of
obligation.”).
5.
Other scholars have approached contract questions from the perspective of ex
ante design, rather than ex post enforcement, with interesting results. See, e.g., Albert Choi &
George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119
YALE L.J. 848 (2010) (arguing that parties can use vague contract provisions efficiently—for
example, material adverse change clauses in acquisition agreements may remain vague
because they are rarely litigated); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation
in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation]
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This inquiry reveals that parties primarily use non-binding agreements to
add formality to an otherwise murky pre-contractual deal process.
Preliminary agreements mark the moment when deal parties have resolved
most deal uncertainty and are likely to do a deal together, whether or not they
sign a preliminary agreement. Instead of causing parties to behave well,
preliminary agreements merely mark the moment when parties were already
primed to behave well, with or without an agreement.
Private mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals are a helpful lens through
which to understand early-stage dealmaking. In the early stages of a private
M&A deal, parties often outline the material terms of their deal in a nonbinding preliminary agreement, such as a term sheet, letter of intent, or
memorandum of understanding.6 These short agreements often list only a
few material business terms, such as price and what is being sold, and can be
signed or unsigned. In some ways, these can be understood as written
versions of handshake agreements, and resemble non-binding agreements in
other contexts, such as engagements to be married.
(examining the efficiency of investment in the design and enforcement phase of the
contracting process, and arguing that parties can lower overall contracting costs by using
vague contract terms ex ante and shifting investment to the ex post enforcement phase);
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187 (2005) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Incomplete Contracts]
(considering the role of litigation in motivating contract design).
6.
See RALPH B. LAKE & UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS OF INTENT AND OTHER
PRECONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FORMS 5–6 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing term sheets, letters of intent, memoranda of understanding and other
precontractual instruments as “a precontractual written instrument that reflects preliminary
agreements and understandings of one or more parties to a future contract”). In the seminal
case about preliminary agreements, Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America v. Tribune Co., 670
F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), Judge Pierre Leval makes a distinction between “Type I”
preliminary agreements and “Type II” preliminary agreements. See Ronald J. Gilson et al.,
Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, & Doctrine, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1426 n.163 (2010) (explaining that Type I agreements are those where
the parties have agreed to material terms, but intend to follow-up with a formal, binding
document). This Article is concerned with Type I agreements. But Type II agreements are
also possible. Type II agreements are binding preliminary agreements, where “parties agree
on certain terms but leave potentially important terms open to further negotiation. This
requires courts to determine whether such an agreement had been made, what the duty to
bargain in good faith entails, and which remedy should be awarded for breach of that duty.”
Id.; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements,
120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 (2007) (describing a Type I agreement as one in which “the
parties have agreed on all material terms and intend to memorialize this agreement in a
formal document”).
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Preliminary agreements in this context are, most often, not formal
contracts: They create no binding obligation under the law.7 In fact, like the
term sheet in SIGA, M&A preliminary agreements are often explicitly marked
“non-binding.” They are also not meant to be enforced when breached.8
Uniquely, M&A parties have both the means and the sophistication to create
binding contracts. In fact, throughout an M&A transaction, parties repeatedly
demonstrate their ability to create binding contracts, which they use to govern
issues both large and small.9 Thus, these sophisticated business parties’ use of
non-binding preliminary agreements is presumably intentional and
considered, rather than the result of lack of resources or skills.
Other scholars have explored the role of preliminary agreements in
dealmaking more generally. That scholarship tends to lump preliminary
agreements from many commercial contexts into one study, which means that
the M&A preliminary agreement, which are somewhat of an oddball in world
of sophisticated contracts, is overlooked. Existing scholarship also usually
assumes that preliminary agreements are a type of contract, and that their
enforceability is an important part of why parties abide by them.
Bob Scott and Alan Schwartz, for instance, examined over 100 cases
involving preliminary agreements to determine preliminary agreements and
how they ought to be enforced by courts.10 They argued that parties use
preliminary agreements when substantial deal uncertainty makes it impossible
for parties to agree to the specific terms of an intended deal. While parties
investigate deal specifics, they enter a preliminary agreement outlining a deal
that will later be formalized in a binding contract, or abandoned if initial
investigations show that the deal is not viable.11 Schwartz and Scott argue
that, to preserve preliminary agreements’ important role in efficient
dealmaking, and to encourage parties to make relationship-specific
7.
See Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex
Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1410 n.27 (2016) (describing an “agreement”
as “a written bargain that might be a contract,” as contrasted with a “contract,” a “binding,
enforceable obligation under the law”).
8.
To the extent parties include binding and enforceable provisions, they are
provisions related to the process of the deal, and not to the material business terms. For
example, provisions related to confidential exchange of information during initial
investigation may be marked binding, and breaches may be enforceable. However, those
limited binding terms are carefully noted as such in the agreement.
9.
See Hwang, supra note 7 (describing the group of contracts and agreements that
parties enter into as an “unbundled bargain”).
10.
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 671 (describing their case survey
methodology).
11.
See id. at 662–63 (describing how parties enter into preliminary agreements).
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investments in a deal prior to resolving uncertainty, courts ought to award
reliance damages when a party breaches a preliminary agreement.12
Albert Choi and George Triantis offer another explanation for why
parties use preliminary agreements: to cope with deal complexity. They argue
that complex deals are entered into in stages—first a preliminary agreement,
then a definitive contract—because some deals are “simply too complex or
too time-consuming to be completed in a single stage.”13 Preliminary
agreements allow time for parties to engage experts, such as lawyers. Those
experts then use their expertise to fine-tune the terms of the deal and to draft
the definitive contracts.14 Like Schwartz and Scott, Choi and Triantis note
that by formally enforcing preliminary agreements, courts may improve deal
efficiency.15
While both of these explanations are compelling, they present some
puzzles. First, neither explains why parties commonly use non-binding
preliminary agreements. If judicial enforcement of preliminary agreements
motivates parties to act efficiently, why do parties go out of their way to
indicate that they do not want judicial involvement?
Second, neither explanation addresses why parties often behave as
though non-binding agreements are binding. Why do parties tend to enter
into a definitive contract after they have signed a non-binding preliminary
agreement? And why does that final contract often contain terms that closely
resemble the preliminary agreement’s initial terms?
This Article attempts to explain the role of non-binding agreements in
modern dealmaking. It shows that these agreements are signposts. They mark
a moment in the deal’s lifecycle when enough uncertainty and complexity has
been resolved that the deal is likely to go forward, and serve signaling,
12.
See id. at 703–04 (arguing that “courts have a further facilitative role: to
encourage exploration of investment opportunities by protecting the promisee’s verifiable
reliance”—in other words, by attaching contract liability to parties who breach preliminary
agreements).
13.
Albert Choi & George Triantis, Multi-Stage Contracting in Complex Transactions
(Feb. 15, 2014 draft, on file with author) at 1 (noting that “some agreements are simply too
complex . . . to be completed in a single stage . . . . [T]he purpose of agreement in the first
stage is to address complexity and set a distinct stage for expert agents, rather than to protect
specific investments under an incomplete contract.”).
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 5 (noting that “the court’s intervention to find a commitment in an earlier
stage can improve the contracting outcome when one or more of the assumptions to the
indifference proposition do not hold. To take one example, when the threat of reputational
sanctions impedes one party from walking away from the negotiations, the court can improve
efficiency by finding a commitment by the other party in the preliminary agreement.”)
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formality, and organizational purposes. Reframing preliminary agreements as
markers for the accumulation of deal momentum explains why, once parties
sign a preliminary agreement, they are likely to complete a deal, and on terms
close to those in the preliminary agreement’s terms. This explanation cuts
against the conventional wisdom that preliminary agreements are contracts
that need to be enforced to promote efficient dealmaking. Rather,
preliminary agreements are devices that promote commitment even without
enforcement.16
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I uses interviews with deal
lawyers to show how parties and lawyers use non-binding preliminary
agreements in modern dealmaking.17 Preliminary agreements are almost
never publicly disclosed, so original interviews with deal lawyers offer a rare
glimpse into a common but little understood deal practice. An important
contribution of this Part is that it attempts to accurately pinpoint when, in a
deal’s lifecycle, parties enter into enter preliminary agreements. Existing
explanations describe preliminary agreements as first steps to a potential deal.
In practice, however, parties enter a preliminary agreement when the deal is
already likely to move forward. Part II introduces the concept of deal
momentum. Specifically, this Part draws an analogy to Lon Fuller’s
distinction between the formal and substantive functions of consideration18 to
16.
Contract law scholarship generally embraces the view that enforcement is an
important tool to motivate parties to comply. See Gilson et al., supra note 6, at 1379 (noting
that “the expectation of formal enforcement creates incentives for parties to perform their
obligations”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 546 (2003) (noting that contracts may be (a) “self-enforcing,” as when
“gains from breach are lower than the expected profit stream from future contracts that
breach would cause to vanish;” (b) enforced informally through reputational sanctions; or (c)
enforced formally. “When contracts fall outside of the self-enforcing range, however, legal
enforcement is necessary to ensure performance . . . when a party’s failure to perform could
threaten its contract partner’s survival; and when contractual surplus would be maximized if
one or both parties make relation-specific investments.”); Robert E. Scott, The Law and
Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279, 280 (2006) (“In particular,
parties wish to make credible (i.e., enforceable) promises to motivate their contracting
partners to invest in jointly profitable activities.”).
17.
The twelve interviewees include nine senior law-firm partners, counsels, and
senior associates with significant private M&A practices, and two senior in-house attorneys
with significant M&A experience. Interviewees practiced at law firms or companies in New
York, Silicon Valley, Chicago, and Houston. For a full list and description of interviews, see
infra App. A.
18.
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941)
(distinguishing between the formal and substantive reasons that courts and parties attach
consideration to contracts).
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show that non-binding preliminary agreements inject valuable form and
formality into an otherwise nebulous negotiation process. Part III considers
the implications of these observations for contract theory, contract
enforcement, and deal design. Specifically, it suggests that courts need not
always enforce preliminary agreements.
The principles developed in this Article can be applied broadly. Within
corporate law, this Article helps to sharpen the theoretical boundaries of the
deal. More broadly, it helps to explain why parties use non-binding
agreements in a variety of contexts, and sheds light on another realm where
private ordering flourishes even when formal enforcement is available.
I.

NON-BINDING AGREEMENTS IN MODERN DEALMAKING

Why and how do parties use non-binding preliminary agreements? This
Part draws on previously unstudied sources—qualitative evidence from
interviews with practicing deal lawyers—to shed new light on the positive
question of how parties use preliminary agreements.
Section A explores existing explanations for why parties use preliminary
agreements. Section B presents the findings from original interviews with
deal lawyers, a survey of recent practitioners’ literature, and a survey of recent
preliminary agreement cases. It shows that most preliminary agreements in
M&A deals are signed, but non-binding. Oddly, however, once parties sign a
non-binding preliminary agreement, their deal is very likely to be
consummated, and on terms similar to the ones that the parties agreed to in
the initial preliminary agreement. This Article calls the combination of these
two attributes “deal stickiness.” Most interestingly, preliminary agreements
are sticky even though there is little consequence for walking away. This final
observation is particularly odd, and appears to cut squarely against the idea
that that consequences, such as enforcement, have an effect on behavior.
Later Parts discuss how non-binding preliminary agreements can shape
behavior and add value, even in the absence of enforcement.
A. Dealmaking in Theory
There are two leading theories on why parties use preliminary
agreements: to resolve deal uncertainty, or to resolve deal complexity. Both
of these theories suggest that preliminary agreements make deals more
efficient, and that, as with other contracts, enforcing them helps motivate
parties to use these efficient tools. This Section outlines those leading
theories after a short primer on the timing of deals.

9
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The Timing of Deals

Parties enter M&A deals in stages.19 The stages are punctuated by two
major events: “signing” and “closing,” which refer to the signing and
execution, respectively, of a definitive acquisition agreement.20
In private M&A deals,21 parties also often enter into a preliminary
agreement before signing the acquisition agreement. The preliminary
agreement “describes the basic terms of the proposed transaction.”22 It may
include, for example, price, a description of what is being sold (such as assets
or stock), and a description of deal structure (such as whether the assets will
be purchased debt-free, whether the buyer will need to secure financing, and
whether the deal is a merger or acquisition). The preliminary agreement also
“usually states that the document is nonbinding.”23 In particular, the
agreement makes clear that the business terms, such as price, are nonbinding.
Provisions governing the negotiation process, however, are often binding.24
For instance, the parties may agree that they are bound to exchange
information confidentially or to negotiate exclusively with each other for a
period of time.25
Signing the definitive acquisition agreement creates true contractual
liability.26 Parties are, at that point, legally obligated to perform the
19.
Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 1 (“Commerical agreements are often entered
into in stages.”).
20.
Jonathan M. Barnett, Hollywood Deals: Soft Contracts for Hard Markets, 64 DUKE
L.J. 605, 618 (2015) (describing the timeline of a “conventional” deal, such as an M&A deal).
21.
Public M&A deals are those that involve at least one public company party that
is obligated by securities laws to disclose the terms of any material agreements to
shareholders. Parties to public M&A deals are substantially less likely to use preliminary
agreements, because they fear that entering into a preliminary agreement may trigger
disclosure obligations. In contrast, private M&A deals do not trigger disclosure obligations.
See George Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities
Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 605 & n.2 (2017) for a discussion of public company
disclosure obligations.
22.
Barnett, supra note 20, at 618 (“First, after some initial discussion, the parties
enter into a preliminary agreement, often called a ‘memorandum of understanding’ or ‘letter
of intent,’ which describes the basic terms of the proposed transaction and usually states that
the document is nonbinding.”).
23.
Id.
24.
LAKE & DRAETTA, supra note 6.
25.
Id.
26.
See id. (describing the package of documents that parties sign at signing).
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transaction.27 There is often a gap in time of several weeks or months
between signing and closing, to allow parties to complete a number of
“closing conditions,” such as obtaining regulatory approval or financing,
reorganizing their corporate structures to maximize the deal’s tax benefits, or
completing due diligence of the target company.28 After parties meet the
closing conditions, they “close” the deal by, for instance, exchanging
consideration for stock or assets.29
It is worth highlighting two common misunderstandings about
preliminary agreements. First, scholars generally do not distinguish between
binding and non-binding preliminary agreements—instead, they seem to
assume that parties intend for preliminary agreement to be binding. This may
be because scholars tend not to distinguish between different types of
commercial deals—and having a binding preliminary agreement is more
common in other contexts, such as in commercial lending and venture capital.
In M&A practice, preliminary agreements tend be the opposite of what is
studied: The vast majority of preliminary agreements are specifically nonbinding with respect to business terms.
Second, scholars routinely misplace when in the deal’s lifecycle parties
enter preliminary agreements. Scholars assume that preliminary agreements
are first steps,30 which parties enter before investigation, and before making
relationship-specific investments. In reality, parties usually sign preliminary
agreements slightly later in the deal process, after most initial investigation is
done. This subtle distinction in the deal timeline is of central importance for
practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, the fact that parties sign
preliminary agreements later in the process suggests that parties are fairly
serious about the deal when they sign a preliminary agreement, which may
inform whether courts should hold parties liable for breach. Theoretically, a
27.
Lou R. Kling et al., Summary of Acquisition Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779,
781 (1997).
28.
See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 260 (1984) (“[M]ajor portions of a typical acquisition agreement
result from the fact that many acquisition transactions contemplate a significant gap between
the date on which the acquisition agreement is signed and the date on which the transaction
is closed.”); Kling et al., supra note 27, at 781 (identifying the need to secure financing as a
reason for a delay between signing and closing).
29.
See Kling et al., supra note 27, at 781 (describing the closing as the moment
“when the acquisition actually occurs”).
30.
See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 663 (“After the parties agree on what
they can, and before uncertainty is resolved, one or both of them make a sunk-cost investment.
This pattern of commercial behavior suggests that the parties have made a ‘preliminary
agreement’ . . . .”).
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clear understanding of timing may help to define the boundaries of deals.
Previous work noted that a deal’s theoretical boundaries extend beyond the
definitive acquisition agreement, and should encompass other
contemporaneous ancillary agreements.31 Mapping the nuanced contours of
the early deal timeline helps contract and corporate law scholars understand
whether a deal begins with preliminary agreements.32
2.

Preliminary Agreements and Deal Uncertainty

In a series of influential papers about preliminary agreements, Alan
Schwartz and Bob Scott argue that parties use preliminary agreements to
resolve deal uncertainty, and that enforcing breaches of these agreements
motivates parties to use then efficiently.
At the core of Schwartz and Scott’s argument is the observation that in
complex deals, parties may not be able to resolve enough uncertainty before
entering into a full, detailed, and definitive acquisition agreement. In order to
resolve uncertainty and determine whether the deal is feasible and
worthwhile, parties need to make relationship-specific investments that
cannot be recouped if the deal does not materialize.33 Relationship-specific
31 [[EDS: cite to Hwang, Unbundled]]
32.
In The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase argued that firms grow larger that is,
firm boundaries grow—if it is cheaper to produce a particular component internally. Firm
boundaries do not grow if it is cheaper to purchase that component from outside the
organization. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393–97 (1937). This
theory has been used to explain why some firms are highly integrated (and large), and others
are more specialized (and rely on outside suppliers to produce most components). It is
possible to think about complex contracting in an analogous way. Contract drafters can
choose to write all of a deal’s terms into one single contract, or to parcel out the terms into
separate contracts. In previous work, I argued that the boundaries of the deal extend beyond
the central, definitive acquisition agreement. See Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 1403, 1410 (2016). Even though a deal can span several agreements and contracts,
the theoretical boundary of the deal extends beyond the physical acquisition agreement, and
encompasses contemporaneously entered ancillary agreements. Id. This Article argues that
the boundaries of the deal can also be extended temporally—that is, the deal can begin earlier
in time than the central acquisition agreement. See infra Part III. For a more modern
discussion of Coase’s theory, see also Peter G. Klein, The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons
from Empirical Studies, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 435 (Claude
Ménard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008) (surveying the empirical literature on firms’ vertical
integration, and providing a summary of Coase’s theory of the firm).
33.
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 663 ("The parties do not agree and,
indeed, may never have attempted to agree on important terms such as the price. After the
parties agree upon what they can, and before uncertainty is resolved, one or both of them make
a sunk-cost investment”).
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investments also create space for parties to behave opportunistically. For
example, Party A might walk away from a deal after Party B has sunk
significant costs into relationship-specific due diligence. Preliminary
agreements, backed with a bit of enforcement bite in the form of reliance
damages, are an efficient way to motivate parties to make relationship-specific
investments to resolve uncertainty, and also to deter opportunism.34
In M&A deals, parties, in some ways, use preliminary agreements in just
the way Schwartz and Scott described. Suppose that the buyer and seller can
agree that the buyer will acquire all of the seller’s business for $50–70 per
share of stock. The parties enter into a preliminary agreement that notes the
price range. The buyer then conducts due diligence on the seller to
understand better the seller’s business’s financial health, which will allow the
buyer to propose a specific price within the agreed-upon range. The buyer’s
due diligence on the seller is a relationship-specific investment—it is specific
to the deal at hand, and information gained in that process cannot usually be
used in another deal if the current one falls through.
Schwartz and Scott argue that, in order to motivate the buyer to
undertake relationship-specific investements like the expensive due diligence
process, the parties must face the threat of enforcement for breaching the
preliminary agreement.35 Without the threat of enforcement, the seller might
walk away from the deal at any time, even when the buyer has already made
significant investments. When a seller behaves opportunistically, of course,
future buyers will be more hesitant to make relationship-specific investments,
which would mean that many efficient deals simply would not take place.
Enforcement also protects the seller. The threat of enforcement against the
buyer deters the buyer from walking away, which is important if the seller
begins the process by granting a period of exclusive access to the buyer.
3.

Preliminary Agreements and Deal Complexity

An alternative theory for preliminary agreements, advanced by Albert
Choi and George Triantis, suggests that deal parties use preliminary
agreements because the sheer complexity of a deal might make it impossible
to complete in one stage. Preliminary agreements can thus help parties deal
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 667 (“A reliance recovery will encourage parties to make preliminary
agreements and will deter some strategic behavior.”).
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with the cognitive load of negotiating many issues at once,36 or allow parties
to buy some time to engage experts to weigh in on the most complex parts of
deals.37 For example, parties may agree to basic business terms during the
preliminary agreement stage, and, in later stages, to engage lawyers,
accountants, and others to work through the details.38 Preliminary
agreements, then, are a way to modularize complex deals—to break complex
transactions into smaller pieces, for the purpose of making them easier to
handle.39
Choi and Triantis suggest that although some deals are too complex to
complete in one step, they are nonetheless worth doing. Using preliminary
agreements tools allows parties to complete deals they would otherwise not
be able to do if they were constrained to one-step deals. Like Schwartz and
Scott, Choi and Triantis also argue that courts ought to enforce preliminary
agreements—at least a little bit—because preliminary agreements are only
useful if parties feel motivated to adhere to them. In particular, they note that
“the court can . . . restrict the bargaining flexibility through the imposition of
the duty to negotiate in good faith, especially on the party with the superior
bargaining position.”40 In other words, enforcing a preliminary agreement
means that parties can rely on their preliminary bargains as they engage in the
costly process of solving deal complexity. Like Schwartz and Scott, Choi and
Triantis argue that attaching some enforcement to preliminary agreements
encourages efficient dealmaking, and deters opportunism.
4.

Enforcement as a Motivator

Both existing explanations for why parties use preliminary agreements
rely on formal enforcement as an important part of the story. This is not a
36.
Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 2 (“As Howard Raiffa framed it, there is a
tradeoff between maximizing the gains from trade by allowing log-rolling across a large
number of issues, and the cognitive load of dealing with all at the same time.”).
37.
Id. (In many cases, the deferred issues are turned over to experts, such as
architects, engineers, accountants, and, in particular, lawyers. While the motivation may be
either the cognitive load or the need for experts, we call this second category as being multistage contracting motivated by complexity.”).
38.
Id.
39.
Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2006) (describing modular contracting as a way to break down complex
systems into smaller, easier-to-understand chunks). See also Hwang, supra note 7, at 1418
(describing the practice of breaking out complex, regulatory-heavy parts of a deal into a
module so that experts can weigh in on those parts).
40.
Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 20.

14

65:2

Hwang

surprise. Much of law is based on the assumption that enforcement can
motivate behavior. Enforcing a criminal law, for instance, is thought to deter
citizens from committing crimes.41 Similarly, damages in products liability
cases is meant to deter unlawful behavior.42 In contract law, the same
conventional wisdom holds: consequences for breaching a contract is meant
to deter parties from breach, and motivate parties to adhere to contract terms.
In the business law context, the idea of enforcement as motivation for
compliance is also closely related to the idea that business contracts (and
contracts in other contexts) have two distinct stages. In the first stage, the ex
ante contract design stage, parties negotiate and agree to terms.43 In the
second stage, the ex post enforcement stage, parties who breach contracts
have to pay to litigate the case, and many ultimately pay damages.44
Sophisticated parties make a thoughtful trade-off between incurring costs
in the design phase or incurring costs in the enforcement phase.45 If parties
invest more time and money in the design stage, their contracts presumably
become more precise and more clear, less likely to be litigated, and easier to
resolve when litigated.46 As a result, the enforcement phase is less costly.
41.
Bidish Sarma, Deterrence and Prosecutorial Accountability, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. __, at __ (forthcoming, 2017) (describing deterrence as “a justification for punishment
premised on the theory that the threat of punishment can deter individuals from breaking the
law”). [[EDS: Please check to see if this is now published/available]]
42.
See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, Casual Responsibility and Patent Infringement, 70 VAND.
L. REV. 565, 620–21 (describing the role of enforcement in deterring unlawful behavior in
both products liability and patent infringement).
43.
Cf. Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 852 (“[D]rawing on the line of scholarship
that analyzes the rules-standards dichotomy in the design of legal rules, recent work frames
the choice between vague and precise contract terms as a tradeoff in information costs:
precise contract provisions raise contracting costs on the front end, but reduce enforcement
costs at the back end.”); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEX L. REV. 1581, 1583–84 (2005) (defining the cost of a contract as the ex ante negotiating
and drafting costs, plus the probability of litigation multiplied by the sum of the parties’
litigation costs, the judiciary’s litigation costs, and judicial error costs).
44.
Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 852.
45.
See id. (noting that contract provisions are sometimes intentionally vague
because “[i]f a provision matters only in remote contingencies, . . . then the back-end costs
should be discounted by that remote probability, and it may be correspondingly efficient to
save front-end costs by using a standard (or a vague term) rather than a rule.”); see also Posner,
supra note 43, at 1587; Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 5, at 817; Steven
Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289, 298 (2005).
46.
See Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 5, at 835 (“When contracts
scholarship is concerned with front-end (transaction) costs, such as the cost of negotiating
and writing contracts, vague terms reduce these costs by letting the enforcing court complete
the contract.”).
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However, parties may also choose to spend less time drafting an agreement in
the design phase—which results in a vague, boilerplate, or not-as-thoughtfully
constructed agreement—on the belief that an enforcement action is unlikely.47
Other scholars have described situations where expending relatively little time
in design is rational. For example, material adverse change clauses in
acquisition agreements are vague, but so rarely enforced that parties often
choose not to expend too much effort making them specific in the design
phase.48 On the other hand, too little investment in design can also backfire
in the enforcement phase. In the recent Martin Marietta49 case, for example,
M&A deal parties entered into a fairly standard confidentiality agreement
without much negotiation.50 In the subsequent enforcement phase, the
agreement cost the buyer the opportunity to close a $5.5 billion hostile
takeover (which was enjoined), and cost both parties significant legal fees.51
Regardless of whether parties choose to allocate their resources to design to
enforcement, however, they are trying to minimize overall costs associated
with the contract, which is the sum of the ex ante stage and the enforcement
phase.52
When formal enforcement is unavailable or not preferred, parties can
substitute with informal enforcement. For instance, some tight-knit
communities, such as those of whalers, diamond merchants, and cotton
merchants, have opted out of formal judicial enforcement for contract
breaches.53 Instead, when a breach occurs, parties turn to trade-association
sanctions or reputational damage.
47.
Choi & Triantis, supra note 5, at 852.
48.
Id. at 852–53.
49.
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208 (Del.
2012).
50.
See id. at 1210–11. See Sasha S. Hahn, Note, “Between” a Rock and a Hard Place:
Martin Marietta v. Vulcan and the Rise of the Backdoor Standstill, 65 HASTINGS L.J 1393 (2014),
for a detailed analysis of the Martin Marietta case.
51.
Hahn, supra note 50, at 1409.
52.
See Posner, supra note 43, at 1583–84.
53.
See George Baker et al., Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 39 (2002); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 3; Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra
note 3 (describing how sales contracts for domestic cotton are not consummated under the
Uniform Commercial Code or enforced in courts—rather, they are drafted under private
contract default rules and disputes are arbitrated in merchant tribunals); Ellickson, A
Hypothesis, supra note 3 (describing the norms that high-sea whalers use to resolve disputes
over the ownership of harvested whales); Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle, supra note 3
(describing the extra-legal, norms-based dispute resolution between cattle ranchers in rural
Shasta County, California).
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As with formal enforcement, informal enforcement relies on the threat
of punishment for breach to curb parties’ behavior. Without enforcement,
either formal or informal, there seems to be little incentive for parties to play
by the rules. Scholarship on preliminary agreements aligns with contract
theory in general in suggesting that enforcement plays an important role in
motivating parties to play by the agreed-upon rules.
B.

Dealmaking in Practice

The conventional wisdom that parties rely on preliminary agreements to
resolve complexity and uncertainty, and that the threat of enforcing those
agreements through reliance damages is what makes parties abide by their
terms, is incomplete.54
This Section presents an alternative view. Previous work in this area has
focused on surveys of enforcement outcomes. This Article relies, instead, on
original interviews with practicing deal lawyers and previously unexamined
practitioners’ literature from the front lines of deal design. It also
supplements these with a traditional survey of court cases in common
business jurisdictions.55
54.
Contracts create a binding obligation to perform. Those who breach a contract
obligation are usually obligated to pay expectation damages. See Lon L. Fuller & William R.
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61(1937) ("Since the
expectation interest furnishes a more easily administered measure of recovery than the
reliance interest, it will in practice offer a more effective sanction against contract breach.”).
It is worth underscoring the fact that an award of expectation damages is a significant
sanction. Expectation damages are designed to put a non-breaching party in the same
position it would have been if the deal had been completed. See Gilson et al., supra note 6, at
1424 n.158 (“Expectation damages purport to put the injured party in the position she would
have been in had the collaborative exploration not only been successfully concluded, but a
joint project also agreed upon and realized.”). In their seminal work on reliance damages,
Lon Fuller and William Perdue identify a spectrum of possible damages, ranging from no
damages to expectation damages. Reliance damages represent one point along that spectrum:
reliance damages are designed to compensate a non-breaching party who has suffered a harm
as a result of relying on the breaching party. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 54, at 54
(describing reliance as a remedy when “the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the
defendant changed his position. For example, the buyer under a contract for the sale of land
has incurred expense in the investigation of the seller’s title, or has neglected the opportunity
to enter other contracts. We may award damages to the plaintiff for the purpose of undoing
the harm which his reliance on the defendant’s promise has caused him. Our object is to put
him in as good a position as he was in before the promise was made. The interest protected
in this case may be called the reliance interest.”).
55.
For more on methodology, see supra App. A.
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This Section begins by showing that preliminary agreements are sticky—
that is, they appear to have strong influence on parties’ behavior. Then, it
shows that stickiness persists despite weak enforcement for breach. Stickiness
in the absence of enforcement presents is a rather odd result. If this is true,
this might suggest that enforcement, either formal or informal, has a much
smaller role in motivating behavior than previously thought. This puzzle sets
the stage for Part II, infra, which introduces the concept of deal momentum
to explain why unenforced, non-binding preliminary agreements have such a
hold on parties’ behavior.
1.

Stickiness

Once signed, preliminary agreements appear to have exceptional
practical binding power, in two ways. First, once parties sign an agreement,
they tend to follow up by entering into a definitive acquisition agreement.
Deals with preliminary agreements also are likely to close. Second, parties
tend not to stray too far from the business terms agreed to in the preliminary
agreement, even though those terms are specifically deemed non-binding.56
This Article describes these two characteristics, together, as preliminary
agreements’ “stickiness.”
Stickiness in preliminary agreements is surprising. First, since scholars
describe preliminary agreements as tools that parties use specifically when
they do not have enough information to sign a definitive contract, it is odd
that preliminary agreements so often lead to parties signing a definitive
contract. In theory, in the process of resolving uncertainty through due
diligence, parties should sometimes discover information that scuttles a deal
by revealing that the deal is not economically worthwhile, or that the other
party is not an ideal partner. The fact that preliminary agreements almost
always lead to the signing of definitive documentation suggests that parties
rarely find information in due diligence that changes their decisions about
whether to do a deal. This, too, would be a surprise. It would suggest that
due diligence is expensive and time-consuming, but largely useless—and yet,
56.
See supra note 16. Dealmakers with a wide breadth of experience—at firms and
in-house, working with repeat players and one-off deal parties, in private and public deals, in
a variety of firms and cities, representing financial parties and strategic parties—report that
preliminary agreements have exceptional binding power. The twelve interviewees include
nine senior law-firm partners, counsels, and senior associates with significant private M&A
practices, and three senior in-house attorneys with significant M&A experience. Interviewees
practiced at law firms or companies in New York, Silicon Valley, Chicago, and Houston. For
a full list and description of interviews, see infra App. A.
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it is a common practice in which sophisticated parties continue to engage. In
other words, if parties use preliminary agreements when deals are uncertain, it
seems odd that uncertain deals tend to lead to definitive contracts and deal
completion.
Second, it is a surprise that parties tend to hew closely to the business
terms initially agreed to in the non-binding preliminary agreement. Parties are
generally required to negotiate in good faith toward a definitive deal. That
duty to negotiate in good faith does not require parties to adhere to the
specific business terms outlined in a preliminary agreement, but parties
nevertheless appear to feel bound by those terms. If parties do need to
renegotiate business terms, they tend not to do so without at least offering a
reason for the deviation.
Stickiness is particularly puzzling in light of the lengths to which parties
go to ensure that, as a legal matter, preliminary agreements are neither binding
nor enforceable. For example, parties routinely include the words “nonbinding” on every agreement page and add provisions that allow parties to
walk away from the agreement without consequences.57 To avoid even the
inference that a preliminary agreement is binding, some deal lawyers advise
their clients not to sign the agreements.58 Nonetheless, the agreements’
business terms stay sticky.
2.

Weak Enforcement

While preliminary agreements tend to be sticky, liability for breaching a
preliminary agreement appears to be limited and weak. A comprehensive
survey of preliminary agreement litigation between business parties reveals
that very few preliminary agreement cases were litigated to opinion in those
jurisdictions.59
One important exception is the SIGA case, which wound its way
through the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts twice in a decade-long
57.
See Barnett, supra note 20, at 618 (noting that a letter of intent or term sheet in a
conventional deal “describes the basic terms of the proposed transaction and usually states
that the document is nonbinding.”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, in Palo
Alto, Cal. (May 23, 2016) (“Pretty much on every page we have something that says that this
is a non-binding agreement—this is non-binding except exclusivity/no shop, confidentiality,
governing law, fee sharing.”).
58.
Telephone Interview with NY Firm Attorney II, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 17,
2016) (“Typically, we advise people not to sign term sheets”).
59.
See Appendix A, infra.
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litigation over a letter of intent.60 Each time the courts concluded a
significant chapter of the SIGA litigation, law firms issued client alerts and
memoranda61 that dissected the meaning of the decision for preliminary
agreement-making in M&A deals. A thorough survey of this practitioner
literature shows that lawyers were surprised by the Delaware courts’ decisions
to enforce a preliminary agreement that had been marked “non-binding.”62
Preliminary agreements are rarely litigated—and parties are almost never
found liable for expectation damages—so when they are found liable for
expected damages, practitioners find the result unusual.
Interviews with deal lawyers also revealed their belief that enforcement
for preliminary agreement breach is rare. This is despite the fact that deal
lawyers, in general, showed a sophisticated understanding of the enforcement
options available to them. Most of the deal lawyers interviewed understood
that preliminary agreements obligated parties to negotiate in good faith
toward a definitive agreement, and that breaching that duty could result in an
award of reliance damages.63 Despite clearly understanding that enforcement
60.
See SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 132 A.3d 1108 (Del. 2015); SIGA
Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330 (Del. 2013).
61.
This Article calls client alerts and memoranda “practitioner literature.”
62.
The SIGA case was litigated to an opinion four times: the Delaware Chancery
Court issued opinions twice, and the parties appealed those decisions to the Delaware
Supreme Court twice. Each time the Delaware courts issued an opinion, law firms that
advised clients in M&A deals issued a flurry of client alerts and memoranda, the issuance of
which indicated that the SIGA decision was out of the ordinary and worth highlighting. With
regard to SIGA I, see, e.g., Robert Burwell & Howard Miller, When a Non-Binding Term Sheet
Becomes Binding, MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY & POPEO PC: CORPORATE &
SECURITIES (July 8, 2013), https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2013/Advisories/3203-0713NAT-COR/index.html [https://perma.cc/H8M5-LFUB] (noting that the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision in SIGA I may require breaching parties to pay expectation damages to nonbreaching parties in preliminary agreement cases, and “propos[ing] ways to mitigate the risk
that a court might award expectation damages based on a ‘non-binding’ term sheet or letter
of intent”); Morrison & Foerster LLP, Delaware Supreme Court: Bad-Faith Attempt to Renegotiate
Term Sheet May Create Liability for ‘Benefit-of-the-Bargain’ Damages, CLIENT ALERT (June 10, 2013),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/delaware-supreme-court-bad-faith-attemp-60366
[https://perma.cc/DNA4-C8ZQ] (noting that in SIGA I, the Delaware Supreme Court’s
“message to negotiators is clear: Don’t agree to a term sheet unless it is explicitly non-binding
or you are prepared to continue negotiations in good faith, consistent with the term sheet.”).
With regard to SIGA II, see, e.g., Richter, supra note 2, see also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
63.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57 (“We are aware
of weird DE cases that talk about duty to negotiate in good faith.”); Telephone Interview
with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, in San Francisco, Cal. (June 2, 2016) (“I know there’s
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was available, however, deal lawyers nonetheless presented a very different
account of how enforcement plays out in practice.
First, deal lawyers describe actively trying to avoid enforceability in their
clients’ preliminary agreements. Most lawyers said that they regularly drafted
provisions stating that parties could walk away from a preliminary agreement
at any time, for any reason.64 Some lawyers took this further, and described
provisions in which the parties agreed that they have no obligation to
negotiate in good faith.65 Lawyers also described taking exceptional care to
ensure that their preliminary agreements are “non-binding” and “nonenforceable.” To do so, they might include document footers stating that an
agreement is “non-binding,” advise their clients not to sign the agreements
(so that the agreements do not look like contracts), and include additional
provisions specifying that some provisions are enforceable (usually
confidentiality, exclusivity, and one or two others) and others are not (the
business terms).66 For example, one lawyer said that letters of intent are, “as a
general proposition, non-binding,” and another described them as
presumptively non-binding but with some binding provisions, like those
governing exclusivity or confidentiality.67 One lawyer noted that “pretty
case law out there saying that [parties] have been sued for walking away [from a preliminary
agreement].”)
64.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney I, in Palo Alto, Cal.
(May 31, 2016) (“Usually, you’ll have an express statement that’s the opposite [of a duty to
negotiate in good faith] in the letter of intent—that parties can walk away for any reason at
all. [You] contract away that obligation.”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I,
supra note 57 (noting that his company uses a letter with language that “represents that we
will negotiate in good faith the terms of the letter. However, notwithstanding, we can
terminate this letter for any and all reasons any time.”); Telephone Interview with In-House
Attorney II, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 25, 2016) (“[O]ccasionally, I have put in that the parties
do agree to negotiate in good faith. So there are times when it’s talked about, and we say
each have a right to walk away”).
65.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney I, supra note 64.
66.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, supra note 63
(“Some clients take the approach that they do want to have some binding provisions in the
term sheet”—confidentiality or exclusivity. “It’s not uncommon to see some binding
provisions in the term sheet. People are pretty clear about what’s binding and not binding.”);
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney III, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Jun. 15, 2016)
(noting that although “[f]rom a legal standpoint, I like to keep the binding and non-binding
documents separate,” he has “moved to using non-binding term sheets along with binding
exclusivity”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney III, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Jun. 20,
2016) (noting that term sheets are “normally signed, because the term sheets are non-binding,
but some things are binding, such as confidentiality provisions, governing law”).
67.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 7,
2016) (“LOIs are, as a general proposition, non-binding.”); Telephone Interview with In-
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much on every page, we have something that says that this is a non-binding
agreement,” while another noted that he went through “great pains to put in
the agreement in ten different ways” that it was non-binding.68 One lawyer
described entering into a binding term sheet only once, and also mentioned
that in drafting that particular term sheet, he could find almost no precedent
for a binding term sheet within his law firm.69
Second, deal lawyers also expressed that even if preliminary agreements
could be enforced as a legal matter, they are so rarely enforced that
enforcement is not considered a real possibility. Lawyers expressed several
reasons for this view. First, they believe that the duty to negotiate in good
faith is an extremely easy duty to meet, and that proving a breach of that duty
in a litigation would be extremely challenging.70 One lawyer, for instance,
noted that “sometimes people do disavow what’s in the term sheet because of
a change in circumstances . . . . I wouldn’t necessarily consider that bad
faith.”71 When asked about the duty to negotiate in good faith, the same
lawyer replied, “[the duty] may be binding, but good luck proving failure to
negotiate in good faith.”72 Another lawyer notes that he has “seen plenty of
deals where buyers walk—they find something better, the numbers don’t play
out, they haven’t had much faith the management team. Deals fall apart all
the time before an agreement. But as far as bad faith, I’ve not been involved
in any situation where the seller thinks the buyer is trying to steal [confidential
information].”73
Third, when asked about their experience with preliminary agreement
enforcement, only two of the twelve lawyers interviewed had even heard of a
threatened litigation over a preliminary agreement.74 One Silicon Valley
House Attorney II, supra note 64 (“I tend to say that the presumption [is that] this is a nonbinding letter of intent, except for sections. Confidentiality and sometimes exclusivity.”).
68.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57 (“Pretty much on
every page we have something that says that this is a non-binding agreement.”); Telephone
Interview with In-House Attorney II, supra note 64.
69.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney IV, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 26,
2016). This lawyer’s firm employs several hundred deal lawyers and is a leading deal firm.
70.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67 (“It may be
binding, but good luck proving failure to negotiate in good faith.”).
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, in Palo Alto, Cal.
(Jun. 20, 2016).
74.
Only N.Y. Firm Attorney II and Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V had heard of a
threat of litigation. See Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney II, supra note 58, and
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, supra note 73.
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lawyer noted that she has never been in a situation where there have been
ramifications for walking away from a term sheet.75 None had worked
personally with a client on a preliminary agreement that was later litigated,
none had threatened to enforce preliminary agreements against others, and
none had been on the receiving end of such a threat.
The lack of appetite for formal enforcement makes economic sense.
Commercial litigation between sophisticated parties is exceptionally
expensive.76 Even though parties make relationship-specific investments
during the preliminary agreement phase, the cost of commercial litigation—
even just the beginning phases of litigation—may easily eclipse the amount
that parties lose by walking away from the preliminary agreement. Moreover,
litigation distracts management and may prevent the company from pursuing
other promising transactions. One lawyer described the loss of having a party
walk away from a preliminary agreement as a “sunk cost”:
Generally, there’s nothing you can do [if the parties walk away from a
preliminary agreement]. [The preliminary agreement] will usually say this
expressly that either party will walk away for any reason or no reason.
Unless you can show fraud or some other behavior that is otherwise
actionable on a standalone basis, you view it as a sunk cost in your
business.77
The decision to avoid litigation is particularly reasonable because the
expected recovery of winning a preliminary agreement contest is low: In most
cases, at best, the winning party can hope to recover reliance damages. The
cost of litigation is high, and the expected recovery of litigation is very low.
Not only is formal enforcement weak, but informal enforcement is also
weak. In settings where informal enforcement is effective, “performance is
encouraged and breach penalized by the cancellation of expected future
dealings with the counterparty, by the loss of reputation (with the resulting
reduction in future business with other potential counterparties in the relevant
economic and social communities), or by an individual disposition toward
reciprocity (and thus a willingness to reward cooperation and punish
defection).”78 In other words, as in formal enforcement settings, those who
do not play by the rules are punished. They earn a reputation for operating
outside of the norm, and their future dealings are suspect. Even when parties
75.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, supra note 63.
76.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67 (noting that it is
“not typical to sue someone else to enforce an obligation to negotiate in good faith” and that
that would be “fact-intensive, expensive litigation”).
77.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney I, supra note 64.
78.
Gilson et al., supra note 6, at 1379.
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do not expect to encounter the same party again in a business setting, they
may be deterred from bad behavior if they do not want to suffer reputational
consequences within their community that may later translate to a loss.79
The community of M&A parties, however, is not like the tight-knit
communities of diamond merchants or rural cattle ranchers, where informal
enforcement works well. For one thing, the community of M&A parties is
not tight-knit. While certain subsets of M&A parties are repeat players—for
example, serial acquirers or private equity firms—many M&A parties rarely
enter the market. As a result, their reputations, good or bad, are less wellformed (and are less important, as they will not be using them in a future
transaction).
Moreover, when interviewed, deal lawyers report, at most, mixed
reputational consequences for parties who back out of preliminary
agreements. One Silicon Valley lawyer, for instance, noted that companies
that serially breach preliminary agreements do gain a bad reputation. “In the
tech world, [if] some serial buyer approaches the sellers, . . . one phone call
and [the sellers] know the buyer and kind of know what to expect. If one
buyer has a bad reputation, like a reputation for reneging the purchase price at
the eleventh hour before signing the [definitive acquisition] agreement, that
will be taken into account.”80
Most other lawyers, however, noted that parties with reputations for
backing out of preliminary agreements are only minimally punished on the
market, if at all. For instance, a New York lawyer began by noting that “if
there was someone who routinely didn’t get deals done, that would become
market knowledge, and be taken into account when thinking about whether
the deal will go through.”81 He immediately qualified the statement, however,
by noting the deals are very fact-specific, and that “the color of [the serial
breacher’s] money is the same as everyone else’s.”82 Another Silicon Valley
lawyer made a similar statement: “There are buyers that have a reputation for
being willing to renegotiate some of the terms. But it’s often based on stuff
79.
Id. at 1392–93 (“Even where the particular parties do not expect to deal with
each other in the future, the tit-for-tat informal enforcement structure will still work if a
misbehaving party expects to trade with others in the future—i.e., if trade will be multilateral
rather than bilateral—so long as that party’s reputation—i.e., the collective experience of
others who have previously dealt with that person—becomes known to future counterparties.
The actions of future counterparties then serve to discipline the misbehaving party.”).
80.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.
81.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, in Palo Alto, Cal. (May 17,
2016).
82.
Id.
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that they find in due diligence. Everyone knows going into the term sheet
[that] it’s all subject to the buyer’s due diligence.”83 In other words, even
when a party breaches a preliminary agreement, it is often thought to be the
result of legitimate, good-faith changes in facts and circumstances, rather than
the breaching party’s bad faith. The same Silicon Valley lawyer also noted
that bad reputation has only a small effect on future deals: “It’s certainly
possible in circumstances where a company is selling itself and there are
multiple different people are interested in it, that if they get two bidders who
were very close in price, there may be . . . [an] inclination to go for the other
one [the bidder who does not have a reputation for breach].” She notes,
however, that management must still look out for investors’ interests, and
investors are interested in getting as high a price as possible.
In light of weak formal and informal enforcement for breach, then, what
accounts for deal stickiness? Part II attempts to explain this phenomenon.
II.

DEAL MOMENTUM

This Part presents a theory of deal momentum to explain why M&A
parties adhere to non-binding preliminary agreements despite the fact that
there is little consequence for breach. In short, by the time parties enter a
preliminary agreement, they have already resolved enough uncertainty that
momentum pushes the deal forward, even in the absence of a preliminary an
agreement. Thus, preliminary agreements are better understood as signposts
for the accrual of deal momentum, rather than as contract-like devices.
Part II.A shows how accurately pinpointing deal timing is important to
understanding how parties use non-binding preliminary agreements. Instead
of using them as first steps to a deal, as scholars previously thought, parties
use preliminary agreements only after they have completed initial due
diligence. Based on a more accurate understanding of deal timing, Part II.B
offers an alternative explanation for why parties use preliminary agreements.
Specifically, it posits that these agreements have both formal and substantive
functions. While the literature has focused exclusively on substantive
functions—preliminary agreements’ resemblance to contracts, and the need
to enforce them as such—preliminary agreements are largely valuable because
they formalize an otherwise unstructured dealmaking phase. In other words,
preliminary agreements are not very useful as contracts, but quite useful in
that they can help parties signal, organize, attach moral suasion, and build
trust.
83.

Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney III, supra note 66.
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A. Not-So-Preliminary Agreements
Perhaps the first place where the literature on preliminary agreements
deviates from modern practice is in its description of when parties enter into a
preliminary agreement. For the most part, the literature describes the
preliminary agreement as the first step in dealmaking. It seems to envision,
for instance, that two CEOs meet for coffee, decide that they wish to do a
deal, and write down some broad terms (such as price ranges) that might suit
them both. After forming this extremely basic plan for doing a deal—which
is what the literature considers a preliminary agreement—the parties then
separate to resolve uncertainty about the deal through due diligence. After
some time, the CEOs then reconvene to hash out the details of their deal.84
In practice, however, the deal timeline looks a little bit different. The
literature is accurate in that a large quantity of due diligence occurs between
the signing of the preliminary agreement and of the definitive agreement.85
M&A due diligence is as an expensive and labor-intensive undertaking: It “is
not simply first-year lawyers looking through boxes of documents. The
process also includes experts in various areas . . . . [and] covers any issue that
a buyer or an investor would possibly care about.”86
What the literature overlooks, however, is the important distinction
between the quantity of due diligence and the materiality of due diligence.
Indeed, in the time between the preliminary agreement and definitive
documentation, parties engage in a high quantity of due diligence process—
both the literature and deal lawyers agree on that point. That quantity,
however, does not represent the process’s importance in determining the
deal’s business terms. For instance, many lawyers note that, despite the
quantity of the diligence done between the preliminary and definitive
agreements, the information discovered in that diligence only “sometimes”
84.
Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 1 (“Commercial agreements are often entered
into in stages.”) see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 662–63 (describing the initial process of
dealmaking).
85.
Douglas Godfrey & Charles Fox, Transactional Skills Training: All About Due
Diligence, 11 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 357 (2009) at 359 (describing the due diligence process as “not
just first-year associates looking through boxes of documents. The process also includes
experts in various areas looking at any subject that the buyer, in the case of an acquisition, is
interested in . . . . Thus, the due diligence process as a whole covers any issue that a buyer or
an investor would possibly care about”); Telephone Interview with SV Firm Attorney II,
supra note 63 (“Most term sheets are finalized before the real due diligence begins”).
86.
Id. at 359.
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causes the parties to renegotiate business terms.87 This suggests that this
phase of due diligence is only sometimes material.
While the bulk of due diligence is performed between signing the two
agreements, most of the material diligence is complete before the parties sign
the preliminary agreement. Consider a company that is auctioning itself. In
preparation for accepting bids, that company will make much of its relevant
financial information available in a physical or virtual data room so that
potential bidders can begin to conduct due diligence.88 That early due
diligence is the most important—it is the information on which the potential
buyer determines the most important business terms.89 In fact, one
publication by non-lawyer deal advisors describes the due diligence process as
largely being completed in the pre-preliminary agreement phase. That
publication describes post-preliminary agreement diligence as “final diligence”
that “generally serves to confirm the consistency and material accuracy of
representations made by the target company.”90 While the buyer will
“often . . . uncover information that will warrant [it] to revise its valuation,”91
the message is clear: From the perspective of bankers and businesspeople,
who set the deal price and negotiate the preliminary agreement’s material
business terms, the bulk of diligence is done before the preliminary
agreement. The voluminous diligence that lawyers do between the
preliminary and definitive agreements is high in quantity and important, but it
is also confirmatory, rather than material, in nature.
Distinguishing the quantity of due diligence from the materiality of due
diligence suggests modifying the conventional understanding of when parties
87.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney III, supra note 66 (“Some of the
legal stuff gets renegotiated based on diligence.”); Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley
Firm Attorney II, supra note 63 (“There are buyers that have a reputation for being willing to
renegotiate some of the terms. But it’s often based on stuff that they find in due diligence.”).
88.
Michael D. Benson & Jeffrey S. Shippy, The M&A Buy Side Process: An Overview
for Acquiring Companies, Stout Risius Ross, at 3–6 (Aug. 2013),
https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/article/ma-buy-side-process-overview-acquiringcompanies [https://perma.cc/83MF-2FX9] (download PDF), at 5 (“Shortly after the
management presentation is concluded, the target will typically provide the acquirer with
access to an online information ‘datasite’ where select legal, financial, operational and other
information on the business can be found so that the acquirer can determine an appropriate
valuation to submit a [letter of intent].”).
89.
Id. (“The [letter of intent] highlights the acquirer’s intention to acquire the
target and sets forth the proposed purchase price along with all relevant key terms, in much
greater detail than did the [indication of interest].”).
90.
Id. at 5–6.
91.
Id. at 6.
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enter into a preliminary agreement. The conventional understanding is that
parties enter into preliminary agreements at the very beginning of the deal. In
practice, however, parties enter into preliminary agreements after finishing
most material due diligence. Thus, preliminary agreements are not very
preliminary, since they are entered into when enough material has been
examined to determine, with some certainty, important business terms like
price.92
Another way to think about bulk and materiality of diligence is to
reframe the deal timeline from the perspective of bankers and businesspeople.
As Choi and Triantis note, the time period between the preliminary
agreement’s signing and the definitive agreement’s signing is characterized by
the addition of experts—such as lawyers—to resolve the deal’s uncertainty.93
This suggests that lawyers often become heavily engaged in the deal only after
the parties have signed the preliminary agreement. From a deal lawyer’s
perspective, then, the real work of the deal begins after the preliminary
agreement. From the perspective of bankers and businesspeople, however,
the deal is finalized in broad strokes at the preliminary agreement stage. This
explains why preliminary agreement terms remain largely unchanged after the
agreement’s signing: —they are business terms that are negotiated by bankers
and businesspeople, who have already completed the bulk of their relevant
diligence prior to the agreement’s signing.
92.
Of course, this separation demands an answer to another question: If the
material diligence is done, what is the bulky diligence that is being done after the preliminary
agreement is signed? Much of the post-preliminary agreement diligence involves reviewing
contracts for “change of control” or “assignment” provisions, that is, determining which
supplier contract, for instance, will be automatically terminated when control of the target
company changes over from the seller to the buyer. In examining those kinds of contracts,
material information can be found that changes price terms. For instance, the buyer might
discover that, while the target has been profitable for many years, it will soon become less
profitable because particular lower price terms will take effect. See id. at 6 (describing “full
due diligence,” in which the buyer examines the target’s “financial statements, operating
reports and other private and confidential company documents (both financial and nonfinancial in nature)”).
93.
Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that even when uncertainty does not
stand in the way of a deal, “complexity of the deal may be a reason for agreeing to a subset of
issues initially and turning to the remaining issues later. In many cases, the deferred issues are
turned over to experts, such as architects, engineers, accountants, and, in particular,
lawyers.”).
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Preliminary Agreements as Signposts for Deal Momentum

Pinpointing when parties enter preliminary agreements presents an
interesting puzzle: If preliminary agreements are not meant to be early
contractual tools that help parties resolve uncertainty,94 then why do they
exist? And if deal terms are close to being finalized by the time parties sign
the preliminary agreement, why do parties divert from the process of
negotiating the definitive agreement and expend time and resources to draft a
non-binding, unenforced preliminary agreement?
This Section offers a new explanation for why and how parties use
preliminary agreements. It begins by distinguishing between an agreement’s
formal and substantive functions, in much the same way other scholars have
distinguished between the form and substance of consideration. Then, it
suggests that preliminary agreements are not primarily powerful because of
their resemblance to contracts, but because they help make an otherwise
unstructured phase of the negotiation process more formal. They are thus
better understood as signposts for when sufficient deal momentum has
accrued, rather than as contracts. In other words, there comes a time in a
deal’s lifecycle when the parties have resolved enough uncertainty that they
are likely to do the deal. The preliminary agreement marks that moment—
when, whether or not parties sign a preliminary agreement, a deal is likely to
go forward.
1.

Form and Substance in Preliminary Agreements

In his seminal article Consideration and Form, Lon Fuller argued that there
are both formal and substantive reasons to attach consideration to contracts.
Fuller notes that enforcing “gratuitous promises”—that is, promises without
94.
Schwartz and Scott, for instance, note that a preliminary agreement is entered
into when “[t]he parties do not agree and, indeed, may never have attempted to agree on
important terms such as the price. After the parties agree upon what they can, and before
uncertainty is resolved, one or both of them make a sunk-cost investment.” See Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 6, at 663. Similarly, Choi and Triantis describe preliminary agreements as
early-stage contracts. They deviate slightly from Schwartz and Scott in the reasons that parties
enter into preliminary agreements—they note that some deals proceed in multiple stages
because “the complexity of the joint undertaking and the difficulty in negotiations”
necessitate a certain time lag to allow parties to turn some issues “over to experts, such as
architects, engineers, accountants, and, in particular, lawyers.” In other words, preliminary
agreements are described as putting in place some initial rules to which the parties agree.
Then, within the boundaries of those rules, parties resolve uncertainty and agree to final
terms. See Choi & Triantis, supra note 13, at 2.
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consideration—“is not an object of sufficient importance . . . to justify the
expenditure of the time and energy necessary to accomplish it.”95 This, Fuller
notes, is a substantive objection, because it relates to the significance of the
promise made: Promises without consideration are not substantively
important. In contrast, most arguments about the need for consideration
relate to the importance of form. Fuller identifies three broad categories that
characterize the functions performed by legal formalities: the evidentiary
function (creating evidence of a contract), the cautionary function (forcing
parties to consider the contract more carefully), and the channeling function
(signaling to the outside world that the contract is enforceable).96
Preliminary agreements, too, have both formal and substantive functions.
So far, other scholars have focused on the substantive aspects of preliminary
agreements. In particular, the literature attributes a preliminary agreement’s
usefulness to the threat of potential remedies for breach (i.e., the award of
reliance damages). Like in contracts, the threat of enforcement of a
preliminary agreement is meant to incentivize adherence. But there is
significant evidence to suggest that the primary contribution of a preliminary
agreement is not its substance, but its form, and the formality it lends to the
negotiating process. By going through the formalities of drafting and signing
a preliminary agreement, parties can signal seriousness to each other and
attach moral suasion to their non-binding agreement. Through the form of a
preliminary agreement, parties can organize their early collaboration, and
introduce lawyers, who act as a set of reputational gatekeepers, to help them
further solidify their certainty in the deal.
2.

Signaling

In the early stages of deal negotiation, parties make very few promises to
each other, formal or otherwise.97 They do, however, begin sinking costs into
investigating each other as potential deal parties, and begin considering the
value of the potential deal.98 At some point, material due diligence is largely
complete, and parties are positioned to begin the expensive process of
95.
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941)
(distinguishing between the formal and substantive reasons that courts and parties attach
consideration to contracts).
96.
Id. at 800–01 (describing the functions performed by legal formalities).
97.
Parties may enter into a confidentiality agreement, in which they agree to keep
the information they exchange confidential. However, after the confidentiality agreement is
signed, there are few other promises.
98.
See Benson & Shippy, supra note 88, at 3–4 (describing the valuation process).
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negotiating a detailed definitive agreement. But before then, parties enter into
a non-binding preliminary agreement.
An important reason that parties incur the expense of entering into nonbinding, unenforced preliminary agreements is to signal to one’s deal
counterparty that one is a good deal partner. One of the most puzzling
interview results is that the deal lawyers interviewed reported seemingly
contradictory information about the consequences for a preliminaryagreement breach. On one hand, they almost uniformly reported that
breaching a preliminary agreement had little or no effect on a non-repeatplayer deal party’s reputation.99 At the same time, deal lawyers also reported
that parties, even (or especially) those that were not repeat players in the
M&A market, cared about “their word,” or having a reputation as an
“integrity player.”100 These observations seem almost diametrically opposed:
Why do non-repeat players care about their reputations, especially if
breaching a preliminary agreement has little effect on their reputations?
One explanation is that even non-repeat players, who do not care about
their reputation on the broader M&A market, care about their reputation
within that particular transaction. M&A dealmaking is a multi-stage process:
After the preliminary agreement, there is more exchange of information, a
more thorough round of deal negotiations, and potentially weeks or months
of daily or near-daily interaction with one’s deal partner.101 In each stage,
99.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81 (remarking
that “[i]f there was someone who routinely didn’t get deals done, that would become market
knowledge, and be taken into account when thinking about whether the deal will go
through,” but that everything was “so facts and circumstances” and that ultimately “the color
of their money is the same as everyone else’s”). But that is not the case in certain tight-knit
subsets of the M&A community. Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, for instance, noted that
reputations may matter in venture capital deals. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley
Firm Attorney V, supra note 73.
100.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67 (“There is
certainly moral suasion to [a preliminary agreement]. I think that most people—there are
exceptions—in the business world, even if they aren’t repeat players in the market, most
players want to be seen as integrity players.”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I,
supra note 57 (“One of the lawyers I worked with in Virginia always he thought about the
term sheet as a gentleman’s agreement. He would say, ‘You gave me your word, and now
you’re trying to walk away from your word?’”); Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm
Attorney IV, supra note 69 (noting that “[parties] felt morally obligated not to ask for a bigger
escrow because they’d asked for a smaller one [in the term sheet]. They can suffer though
this problem or they cannot go back on their word. The business people want to not go back
on their word.”).
101.
Benson & Shippy, supra note 88(describing the multiple rounds of interaction,
due diligence, and negotiation that are involved in the dealmaking process).

31

65:2

Hwang

there is an opportunity for increasingly granular negotiation and interaction.
And, if the deal is actually completed, many of those who interacted during
the M&A process may continue to work together indefinitely within the
merged company. It is not uncommon, for instance, for the target company’s
key employees to be deeply involved in the dealmaking process. After the
deal is done, these same key employees often continue to work for the buyer
for a period of time, or indefinitely. Thus, individual people may become
repeat players within the context of one particular deal, because they must
interact numerous times with the other side during the dealmaking process.
When an M&A deal is framed as a multi-step process, it becomes clear why
lawyers describe deal parties as caring about their reputations. A preliminary
agreement is one of the deal parties’ first opportunities to interact with each
other, and to prove that they are trustworthy deal parties. Adhering by deal
terms, especially non-binding terms, helps to build one’s reputation within the
context of that deal and to smooth the transaction process going forward.
Preliminary agreements may also serve a different signaling function.
Because parties sign them when there is enough deal momentum for a deal to
go forward, signing a preliminary agreement might also be a way to signal that
they have reached that tipping point. One lawyer, for instance, drew an
analogy between preliminary agreements and giving gifts when dating: “You
go on dates, . . . but that doesn’t mean you’re getting married. But you give
gifts sometimes. It means some level of commitment.”102 In other words,
preliminary agreements may be a “gift” to signal that one is interested enough
and serious enough to undertake the expense of negotiating and signing a
preliminary agreement.
Thus, even though parties can legally walk away from a preliminary
agreement or deviate from its terms, adhering to the terms may serve
important signaling functions to one’s deal partner. This means that,
independent of its substantive uses, entering into a preliminary agreement
may be an attractive step to take.
3.

Organization

The formal process of entering into a preliminary agreement also serves
organizational purposes. One deal lawyer, for instance, described having a
central document to focus on as the primary reason for having a preliminary
agreement:
102.

Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney II, supra note 58.
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It helps me and the deal team focus on whether there’s a deal to be had.
Too many times the business people come and they think they have a
great idea. Like, I’m going to put my chocolate in your peanut butter.
You have to sit back and be like, that’s great, but who’s going to pay for
the packaging? The marketing? How about employees? [A term sheet]
helps both sides knock out the material terms and figure out if there’s a
skeleton to get the deal done.103
Other deal lawyers described a similar purpose for using preliminary
agreements: to “mak[e] sure there’s a meeting of the minds on fundamental
deal provisions,”104 to “make sure the parties are in the same ballpark,”105 and
“even though it’s non-binding, it helps to solidify whether there’s a meeting
of the minds on the material agreements.”106
Similarly, preliminary agreements can be a tool for getting the attention
of upper management by creating a central document on which the board of
directors can vote. Lawyers also note that having a tangible document, even
if unsigned or specifically marked non-binding, helps management feel
“comfortable that this is a real offer” and that there is a basic agreement that
justifies “getting the bankers spinned up and the attorneys spinned up and
getting the internal people and the accounting [and] finance people
involved.”107 In other words, even though the preliminary agreement is nonbinding, preliminary agreements can be a useful tool around which upper
management can have discussions and focus their efforts.
In addition to aiding internal organization, parties might use a
preliminary agreement to organize external affairs. For instance, lawyers
report using preliminary agreements to begin the antitrust review process, or
to solidify financing for a leveraged deal.108
4.

Attaching Moral Suasion

Deal parties and deal lawyers also use preliminary agreements to impose
a sense of moral obligation or moral suasion on the other party in a
103.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney II, supra note 64.
104.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81.
105.
Id.
106.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67.
107.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.
108.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81 (“Often times
the existence of a [letter of intent] or [memorandum of understanding] that is not binding will
be simply done for execution purposes. For example, you can make a Hart-Scott filing on a
[letter of intent].”).
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preliminary bargain. Moral suasion is the process through which actors are
encouraged to act a certain way not because of material incentives, but
because of normative, or moral, appeals. Regulators, for example, sometimes
appeal to private actors’ sense of morality or altruism in order to ensure
compliance, rather than ensure the same through formal sanctions. Moral
suasion can also compel parties to take on activities that are not economically
in their best interest.
Many lawyers report that even non-repeat players care about hard-toquantify factors such as morality and integrity. One deal lawyer notes that
“even if [M&A parties] aren’t repeat players in the market, most players want
to be seen as integrity players. At the time they enter into the [preliminary
agreement], they have a good faith intention to do the deal.”109 Multiple deal
lawyers reported that preliminary agreements created some kind of integrity
bond. They noted, for example, that a deal party might not ask for a change
in a term sheet’s business terms because “they cannot go back on their word”
and because an M&A deal party’s business people, who negotiated the
preliminary agreement’s terms, “want not to go back on their word.”110
Another lawyer described having a senior colleague explain to him that a term
sheet is a “gentleman’s agreement” and if someone backed out, the senior
colleague “would say, ‘you gave me your word, and now you’re trying to back
away from your word?’”111 Repeatedly, lawyers called preliminary agreements
“gentlemen’s agreements” or “handshake agreements”112—terminology which
belies a belief that these agreements create moral suasion even though they
are non-binding.113 Since the amount of legal obligation that parties take on
when they enter a preliminary agreement is very small, this moral suasion may
actually play a greater role in motivating parties to adhere to the bargain than
the role played by legal obligation.
In preliminary agreements between M&A parties, moral suasion is
particularly important for two reasons. First, deal parties do not think of their
109.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67.
110.
Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney IV, supra note 69.
111.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.
112.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney I, supra note 64
(“There’s a moral obligation to live up to the handshake agreement. Most people try to live
up to that. And honestly there has to be some trust. If there’s not trust between the parties,
no deal gets done. They shake hands at that price and they both behave that they will a
certain way.”); Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57 (describing nonbinding preliminary agreements as “gentlemen’s agreements”).
113.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67 (“There is
certainly moral suasion to [a preliminary agreement].”).
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agreements as formally enforceable, as a legal matter. Moral suasion allows
parties to add seriousness and heft to agreements that otherwise have none.
Second, moral suasion in this context motivates party behavior in a way that
informal enforcement usually cannot. Most informal enforcement works by
depriving a bad actor of future interactions. For example, if Anna breaches
an agreement with Brian, Brian’s informal-enforcement recourse is to refuse
to interact with Anna in the future, or to damage Anna’s reputation so that
others will not interact with her in the future. M&A deal parties, however, are
often not repeat players, so they are, in a way, judgment-proof from informal
sanctions. Attaching moral suasion, a non-forward-looking riff on informal
sanctions, allows M&A deal parties to motivate their counterparties to behave
well, even when none of the parties are repeat players. Although deal lawyers
never said as much, they seemed to imply that feeling guilty about not being
an integrity player motivated parties to behave well, even if parties felt no
threat of a future economic or reputational loss.
5.

Verification

Although deal lawyers generally report that serial preliminary-agreement
breachers suffer from few, if any, reputational consequences, the same may
not be true of deal advisors. Where deal parties themselves are immune to
informal enforcement, the reputation of related repeat players, such as the
investment bankers and lawyers that advise on the deal, may play a role.
Deal advisors can be thought of as gatekeepers—independent entities
that serve as an outside monitor, “who screen[ ] out flaws or defects or who
verifies compliance with standards or procedures.”114 The role of gatekeepers
in curbing bad behavior is well developed in the corporate governance
literature. Gatekeepers have two different roles: They can be in a position “to
prevent wrongdoing by withholding necessary cooperation or consent,” or
they can be “reputational intermediar[ies] to assure investors as to the quality
of the ‘signal’ sent by” another entity. In the literature, auditors are “the
paradigmatic examples of ‘gatekeepers’—that is, independent professionals
who are interposed between investors and managers in order to play a
watchdog role that reduces the agency costs of corporate governance.”115
114.
John C. Coffee Jr., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 2 (2006).
115.
John C. Coffee Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries,
Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting 2 (Columbia Law Sch. The Ctr.
for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 191, 2001).
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In M&A deals, deal advisors can play the role of reputational
intermediaries. For example, a handful of elite law firms advise most M&A
deal parties, and even when their clients are not repeat players, the law firms
are.116 Thus, even when deal parties are not concerned with reputational
losses from breaching preliminary agreements, their lawyers will be
concerned, and may advise their clients to think carefully both during the
entry of the preliminary agreement and before walking away.
*

*

*

*

In short, the power of preliminary agreements comes not from the fact
that they allow parties to attach formal sanctions, as contracts do. They do
not set up frameworks in which parties can resolve deal uncertainty, because
most material uncertainty is resolved before parties sign a preliminary
agreement. Rather, preliminary agreements are useful because they are central
documents that parties can use as a reference, or to organize their affairs,
either internally or externally. They mark a moment in time when parties
have resolved enough uncertainty that a deal is likely to occur, whether or not
they actually set forth their dealmaking intent on paper in a preliminary
agreement. In other words, preliminary agreements are not necessary to get a
deal done. They are a step that parties take when a deal is all but inevitable.
One easy way to see the lack of necessity for preliminary agreements is to
examine when preliminary agreements are most prevalent. Specifically,
preliminary agreements are very common in private M&A deals—deals in
which parties do not need to disclose the deal to securities regulators—and
quite uncommon in public deals.117 The broad strokes of the deal contracting
process remain the same, whether the deal is private or public. Parties
perform due diligence, sign a contract, and then close the deal.118 In public
deals, however, preliminary agreements are rare because parties do not wish
to trigger the need to make a securities filing. Nonetheless, public deals are
116.
Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering,
41 J. CORP. L. 393, 396 (2015) (arguing that law firms add value because certain elite law firms
“repeatedly engage in the same type of high-stakes transactions [and] acquire private
information about the range of plausible deal terms and their current market prices that other
players cannot replicate”).
117.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, supra note 63.
118.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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completed, which suggests that preliminary agreements are not a necessary
step in dealmaking.119
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT AND DEAL DESIGN
This Part discusses implications for deal design and contract
enforcement. It also builds on previous work,120 which began the process of
trying to understand the theoretical and contractual boundaries of the deal.
Section A argues that enforcing preliminary agreements may not be necessary,
and may in fact deter efficient use of preliminary agreements. This
contravenes the conventional wisdom that some enforcement is necessary to
induce efficient use. Section B discusses the implications of how changing
enforcement of preliminary agreements can and should change how deal
parties use preliminary agreements. In particular, deal parties can more freely
embrace preliminary agreements as organizational tools, rather than as
contracts.
Finally, Section C explores how preliminary agreements fit into a
discussion of the boundaries of a complex bargain. A previous article
introduced the idea that the boundaries of a deal might exceed the four
corners of an acquisition agreement, and, in fact, exist also in the many
ancillary agreements that parties sign.121 This Section argues that perhaps the
boundaries of a deal can also be stretched temporally, to the preliminary
agreement phase. Just because the theoretical boundaries of a deal extend
temporally, however, does not mean that enforcement must map on to the
deal boundaries. In fact, enforcement to the edges of a deal’s boundaries may
crowd out efficient private ordering.
A. Enforcement
By understanding how preliminary agreements work in practice, courts
may be better equipped to interpret and enforce agreements and contracts
119.
One might argue that in public deals, there is enough readily-available
information about the target that parties do not need a preliminary agreement in order to
create a framework for more thorough diligence of the target. This argument, however, does
not account for the fact that even in deals where public companies acquire private ones in
deals of sufficient size to trigger securities filings for the public acquirer, the parties try not to
use preliminary agreements. In these types of public-private deals, there is not sufficient
information about the private target to resolve uncertainty about the target. Nonetheless, the
parties do not need to enter a preliminary agreement in order to do a deal.
120.
Hwang, supra note 7.
121.
Id.
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between sophisticated parties. In the case of preliminary agreements,
sophisticated parties appear to use preliminary agreements in way such that
they need not always be formally enforced. In fact, there are instances where
formal enforcement may disincentivize parties from making efficient deals.
A central tenet of contract theory is that negative enforcement outcomes
(or the threat of them) affect parties’ behavior. Moreover, more severely
negative enforcement outcomes should be more effective at curbing bad bad
behavior. But those observations often miss an important point: that the
probability of the negative outcome also plays a role in affecting parties’
behavior.
Consider this scenario: Jane and Anne are parties to a contract. They
agree that, if Anne breaches the contract, Jane will take all of Anne’s personal
belongings and set them alight on the sidewalk. The enforcement outcome is
very negative—a breach might result in the loss of all of Anne’s personal
belongings in a public, traumatizing, and humiliating way. However, Anne
may know that if she breaches, there is only a one percent chance that Jane
will actually burn her belongings. Even if she breaches, she can rest assured
that Jane is very unlikely to enforce.
Thus, when Anne is considering whether to breach a contract, the cost
of breach is not that she loses her belongings. Rather, the cost of breach is
the probability of enforcement—in this scenario, one percent—multiplied by
the negative utility of the enforcement. In other words, Anne considers the
expected value of breach, rather than assuming that Jane will certainly
enforce. In this scenario, then, the expected cost of breach is close to zero.
Thus, even though the enforcement outcome is very negative, Anne can
breach often and with impunity, safe in the knowledge that her belongings
will most likely be spared from a fiery end.
When the probability of enforcement is close to zero, even very negative
enforcement outcomes do little to motivate parties to adhere to contract
terms—and that also appears to be true in the case of preliminary agreements.
This observation is not entirely new, although it is has received limited
attention in the literature. What analysis exists is situated in research about
the use of rules and standards in particular contract provisions. For example,
Choi and Triantis made a similar observation in an earlier article on the
strategic vagueness of material adverse change clauses in acquisition
agreements. In their article, they note that to parties, the cost of a contract
provision is the sum of its ex ante negotiating and drafting costs, and its ex
post enforcement costs. There is a trade-off between the two: more
investment on ex ante drafting makes a provision clearer, which reduces ex
post enforcement costs by eliminating some litigations and abbreviating
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others. Choi and Triantis note that material adverse change clauses have a
very low probability of enforcement. That low probability might explain why
those clauses are vague: Parties rationally choose not to invest the high cost
of ex ante negotiation and drafting, on the theory that the expected ex post
cost of enforcement is low.
In the context of preliminary agreements, breaching parties can expect
the cost of breach to be particularly low. For one thing, preliminary
agreements are rarely enforced, which means the probability of enforcement
is close to zero. Even when enforced, moreover, the breaching party pays
only reliance damages, which is a very low cost. In other words, parties to a
preliminary agreement can breach with impunity, with the understanding that
the expected cost of that breach is close to zero. This means, of course, that
ex post enforcement of preliminary agreements already does very little to
deter bad behavior from parties. But, as this Article shows, preliminary
agreements have many useful features—and even the threat of enforcement
may deter parties from using preliminary agreements’ useful, non-contract
features.
For example, the threat of enforcement may deter parties from using
preliminary agreements as an organizational tool. Consider, for example, a
scenario in which preliminary agreement breaches are enforced like contract
breaches: breaching parties are responsible for expectation damages. In this
scenario, parties may be deterred from using preliminary agreements for fear
that writing down even vague, preliminary, conditional intent to make a deal
might result in expectation damages for breach. To a lesser extent, attaching
the possibility of reliance damages to a breach may already have a similar
deterring effect. In fact, parties already behave differently because of the
consequences of writing down a preliminary agreement. Public company
deals, for example, almost never involve a preliminary agreement, because
parties fear that writing down the preliminary agreement will trigger onerous
disclosure obligations.
While a preliminary agreement is certainly not necessary to dealmaking, it
may still be helpful, and the law ought to be formulated in a way that
incentivizes the use of helpful tools. Deal lawyers describe preliminary
agreements as useful organizational tools: They can be useful in forcing
businesspeople to decide on deal terms and can be touchstones when parties
stray from the intent of the original deal. Dialing back the threat of formal
enforcement may mean that parties feel more comfortable writing down their
preliminary agreements, which is good, because it means that parties are able
to be more organized in early dealmaking.
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Moreover, making formal enforcement an available remedy, even if it is
rarely used, is not costless to the public. The cost of formal enforcement is
borne by both private parties (who incur litigation costs) and the public
(through the expenditure of judicial resources in adjudicating these
disputes).122 Few preliminary agreements are litigated to opinion, but it is
hard to say how many preliminary agreements litigations are commenced. As
soon as litigation commences, the public incurs costs. Reviewing complaints,
setting motion schedules, and adjudicating motions to dismiss tie up judicial
resources that could be spent elsewhere. Using judicial resources to
adjudicate preliminary agreement disputes seems particularly wasteful,
because parties, for the most part, appear to be able to sort through their
differences without judicial intervention.
Although it may make sense to dial back on preliminary agreement
enforceability, this Article does not argue that we ought to do away entirely
with enforcing contracts between parties. Here, it is important to highlight a
distinction between preliminary agreements (between sophisticated parties)
and formal contracts (between the same).
Preliminary agreements are not contracts—they are signposts and
organizational tools. When parties sign a preliminary agreement, they do not
mean to create an obligation to perform. Rather, they intend to organize their
thoughts and actions. However, the moment when parties can organize their
thoughts on paper happens to coincide with the moment when parties have
already done enough diligence on each other and on the potential deal that
the deal is likely to go through. The fact that these moments occur at the
same time creates the illusion that preliminary agreements work like
contracts—that parties agree on something, and then they perform because
they are obligated to do it. In reality, however, preliminary agreements are
not meant to be contracts. They create no legal obligation, and parties’
performance is not because of any legal obligation.
In contrast, contracts create a binding and enforceable obligation under
the law. When parties sign a contract, they do mean to create an obligation to
perform. Their performance of a particular agreed-upon term after the fact is
because they are obligated to perform. The key, then, is parties’ intent: in
preliminary agreements, parties do not intend to create an obligation, so they
ought not be punished for failing to meet that non-obligation. In contracts,
parties do intend to create an obligation, so they ought to be liable when they
fail to meet that obligation. And, as discussed here, the punishment—
through formal enforcement and award of appropriate damages—is what
122.

Posner, supra note 43.
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motivates parties to perform the obligation they previously agreed to. Thus,
keeping enforcement intact—and making that enforcement powerful—when
parties intend to create obligations is important to motivating parties to keep
their promises.
B.

Deal Design

If preliminary agreements are not enforced as contracts, parties will be
more likely to use them in deals, which is a positive outcome. Just because
preliminary agreements do not increase dealmaking efficiency by solving for
uncertainty does not mean that preliminary agreements do not increase
efficiency in other ways. In particular, a preliminary agreement can be a
valuable organizational tool, for several reasons.
A preliminary agreement can help to focus deal teams around a common
deliverable. One lawyer, for example, noted that he went through “great
pains to put in the [preliminary] agreement in ten different ways” that it was
not binding, but still liked to use a preliminary agreement because “it helps
me and the deal team focus on whether there’s a deal to be had.”123 He noted
that “too many times, the business people come and they think they have a
great idea. Like, I’m going to put my chocolate in your peanut butter. You
have sit back and be like, that’s great, but who’s going to pay for the
packaging? The marketing? How about employees? [A preliminary
agreement] helps both sides knock out the material terms and figure out if
there’s a skeleton to get the deal done.”124 Preliminary agreements are so
useful as organizational tools that one lawyer described using them even when
they were not shared with the other side—in other words, even when they
were unilateral and bore no resemblance to contracts. That lawyer noted that
a “[t]erm sheet might be prepared even just for internal use,” to be used for
talking points, and that it “may form the basis for the discussion at an early
stage.”125
A preliminary agreement can also help to ensure that parties are in
general agreement at the start of the deal, which helps parties establish
whether there is enough agreement to move forward in the deal. For
instance, several lawyers loosely described a preliminary agreement as a way to
ensure that there was a “meeting of the minds”126—although they also
123.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney II, supra note 64.
124.
Id.
125.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81.
126.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57; Telephone
Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney I, supra note 67; Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm
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seemed adamant that preliminary agreements were not contracts. One lawyer
noted that he used preliminary agreements because “[y]ou want some kind of
meeting of the minds before you get the bankers spinned up and the
attorneys spinned up and getting the internal people and the
accounting/finance involved.”127 Another described preliminary agreements
as a way to save money and save time by ensuring that there was a “meeting
of the minds on fundamental deal provisions” before engaging advisors and
beginning diligence.”128 He noted that a preliminary agreement was a way to
“make sure the parties are in the same ballpark.”129 Still another lawyer noted
that “[y]ou generally want to make sure there’s a meeting of mind on both
sides before you crank out [diligence, advisors].”130
Finally, a preliminary agreement can help to minimize the costs of
renegotiation. As parties move forward toward signing definitive
documentation, they might legitimately forget previously agreed-to terms, or
disingenuously “forget” deal terms in order have a chance to renegotiate
them. A preliminary agreement, which functions as written (and possibly
signed) evidence of how the parties agreed to proceed, can help to stop some
of those renegotiations before they become too costly. One lawyer, for
instance, noted that “If someone tries to renegotiate something in a term
sheet, and if I’m not trying to renegotiate, then I’ll point to the term sheet.
I’ll say ‘we entered into this term sheet for a reason.’”131
Although preliminary agreements are valuable organizational tools, they
are under-utilized in public deals. At present, deal lawyers use preliminary
agreements almost exclusively in private deals. Deal lawyers shy away from
using preliminary agreements in public deals, for fear that signing a
preliminary agreement will trigger a public disclosure obligation.132 There are
many reasons to avoid public disclosure of a preliminary agreement. For one
thing, filing a public disclosure requires additional cost. For another,
preliminary agreements are, by nature, preliminary and subject to change.
Disclosing their terms before the parties have fully vetted each other through
Attorney III, supra note 81; Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, supra
note 73.
127.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.
128.
Telephone Interview with N.Y. Firm Attorney III, supra note 81.
129.
Id.
130.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney V, supra note 73.
131.
Telephone Interview with In-House Attorney I, supra note 57.
132.
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley Firm Attorney II, supra note 63 (noting
that public companies usually do not want to use letters of intent because they do not want to
trigger disclosure obligations).
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the diligence process can send incorrect signals to the public, and cause the
market to react in ways that are unforeseen—and, in the parties’ eyes,
inaccurate. Perhaps most importantly, parties might fear that a change in the
preliminary agreement after it has been publicly disclosed will be received
poorly by the market. For instance, after the parties sign a preliminary
agreement, the buyer may cancel the deal because it is unable to secure
financing, or because it has changed its business plan. The public, however,
might interpret the deal cancelation as evidence of a defect in the target
company. Fear of these misinterpretations causes parties in public deals to
avoid, rationally, the risk associated with filing a preliminary agreement.
But deals, whether public or private, face similar organizational
challenges. In fact, public deals may be harder to organize than private
deals—for instance, disclosure and reporting requirements imposed upon
public companies add another layer of complexity to deals. Already, lawyers
in both public and private deals use some of the same tools to address
organizational complexity. For example, deal lawyers use signing and closing
checklists to keep track of the deal’s many tasks and documents.133 These
detailed to-do lists outline each step of the deal, who is responsible, and the
status of completion.134 Deal lawyers in both types of deals also use working
group lists, which help parties organize and identify the many players involved
in the transaction, including deal lawyers representing all parties, regulatory
specialists, and in-house point people, among others.135
Preliminary agreements can be another useful organizational tool in a
deal lawyer’s toolkit. Making a clearer distinction between preliminary
agreements and contracts is a first step toward incentivizing deal parties to
use preliminary agreements as organizational tools. Parties in public deals shy
away from signing preliminary agreements, for fear that signed agreements
might be construed as contracts that need to be publicly disclosed. Parties
and courts can both take steps to mitigate those fears. First, parties can
choose, as they already sometimes do, to use preliminary agreements, but not
to sign them. Parties already use unsigned organizational tools, such as
checklists, to serve similar collaborative purposes, and do not publicly
disclose those tools’ contents. Second, courts can embrace the view that
preliminary agreements are not contracts, and should not be enforced as such.
133.
Hwang, supra note 7, at 1413 (describing the M&A deal checklist, which keeps
track of all deal documents and action items).
134.
Id.
135.
Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV
281, 319–20 (2016) (describing cross-firm collaborations).
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A uniform interpretation of preliminary agreements as organizational tools
rather than as contracts may help to build a norm of using them, and a norm
against classifying them as contracts, for securities-law and other purposes.
C.

The Temporal Boundaries of the Deal

Previous work argued that, contrary to conventional assumptions, deal
boundaries are not defined by the definitive acquisition agreement.136 Rather,
deals are struck through many contemporaneous agreements that interact to
form a deal, and their theoretical boundaries must expand to include those.
Previous work further argued that if deals consist of many contracts, contract
disputes involving one contract should perhaps be considered with reference
to related contracts within the same deal.
Of note, however, is that previous work limited the boundaries of the
deal only to contracts that are entered into at the same time as the acquisition
agreement. It specifically excluded non-contract agreements, and agreements
and contracts entered into non-contemporaneously with the acquisition
agreement. In other words, it clearly defined contemporaneous contracts as
within the boundaries of the deal, and noted that other contract-like tools
were too difficult to categorize without further study.
By investigating preliminary agreements, this Article tries to understand
whether those non-contemporaneous, non-contract agreements can be
considered within a deal’s boundaries. More clearly defining which
documents are within the deal’s boundaries can aid in contract interpretation.
Judges, for instance, can look to other documents within the deal’s
boundaries to help sharpen their understanding of the deal, or to help
interpret vague provisions.
Preliminary agreements are a particularly interesting part of the dealboundary puzzle. On one hand, a preliminary agreement bears strong
resemblance to the document at the very center of a deal: the acquisition
agreement. Unlike an ancillary agreement, which contains provisions that
supplement an acquisition agreement’s provisions, the preliminary
agreement’s provisions are, by and large, the same as the acquisition
agreement’s provisions. Because preliminary agreements bear such a close
resemblance to acquisition agreements, preliminary agreements appear very
much at the center of deals, and therefore firmly within the deal’s boundaries.
Placing the preliminary agreement so firmly within the deal’s boundaries,
however, has consequences that appear, plainly, to be against the intent of the
136.

Hwang, supra note 7, at 1449 .
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drafting parties. For example, if preliminary agreements are at the center of
deals, their terms might be useful in interpreting ambiguities in the acquisition
agreement. But parties clearly intend for preliminary agreements not to be
binding, which means that parties intend to leave room for acquisition
agreement terms to sometimes, by design, deviate from the preliminary
agreement’s terms. Thus, it seems unreasonable to use the preliminary
agreement to interpret ambiguities in the acquisition agreement.
While preliminary agreements do look very much like acquisition
agreements in some ways, they also deviate quite substantially from the other
documents that are clearly within the boundaries of the deal. Employment
contracts for key employees, for instance, are clearly within the boundaries of
the deal, but preliminary agreements are not very much like employment
agreements at all. Employment agreements are often necessary to the deal
and preliminary agreements are not. Employment agreements also provide
supplemental provisions to the acquisition agreement, which suggests that
employment agreements and acquisition agreements ought to be read
together to resolve ambiguity. In contrast, preliminary agreements are not
supplemental to the acquisition agreement. Ambiguities cannot be resolved
by reading the two agreements together, because differences between them
are likely by design. Perhaps the most important difference, however, is that
employment agreements, and most other ancillary agreements that are clearly
within the boundaries of the deal, are contracts. Although preliminary
agreements may resemble lesser contracts, this is not the best way to
understand them.
On balance, it appears that preliminary agreements ought not to be
considered part of the bargain. Perhaps one important principle that can be
distilled from this Article’s investigation into preliminary agreements is that
only deal contracts ought to be eligible to be considered part of the bargain.
Preliminary agreements, which are prone to change, are not contracts, so they
cannot be used to interpret other parts of the deal.
One important note, however: although preliminary agreements are not
signed at the same time as the acquisition agreement, it is not this timing
mismatch that makes preliminary agreements not part of the bargain. In fact,
there are other contracts signed before the acquisition agreement that clearly
are part of the bargain. Confidentiality agreements, for example, are binding
contracts, and they are often incorporated by reference into the acquisition
agreement. Their incorporation by reference indicates that parties intend for
them to be part of the bargain even though parties enter into them well in
advance of the acquisition agreement. Exclusivity agreements—and even the
binding exclusivity provisions of otherwise non-binding preliminary
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agreements—fall into the same category. They are far removed, temporally,
from the acquisition agreement. However, because they are contracts, and
because parties show clear intent for them to be part of the bargain, they
clearly are part of the bargain. In contrast, non-contract documents, no
matter their temporal proximity to the signing of the acquisition agreement,
are not within the boundaries of the bargain.
CONCLUSION
Existing scholarship misunderstands the role of non-binding preliminary
agreements in high-value, complex M&A deals. This Article argues that nonbinding agreements should not be treated as contracts, but as signposts for
the accumulation of deal momentum. They enhance deal efficiency through
their formal, rather than substantive, functions. Understanding non-binding
agreements has significant implications for enforcement, theory, and deal
design. But while this Article has focused on non-binding agreements in the
context of M&A deals, the concept of deal momentum has broad applicability
in the law, and may shed light on non-binding agreement use in areas from
family law to international treaty-making.
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APPENDIX A: A NOTE ON METHODS; INTERVIEWS
Existing scholarship on preliminary agreements has also focused on the
results of enforcement, that is, reported opinions from cases that are litigated
to a decision. But these enforcement surveys are necessarily incomplete,
because most commercial litigation settles out of court,137 unaccompanied by
reasoned judicial opinions that shed light on the circumstances of these deals.
This Article brings previously un-surveyed qualitative data to the debate
in order to close this gap in the literature. In this Article, I rely on three types
of inquiry, which are described in more depth below. First, I surveyed
literature from practicing lawyers, such as client alerts and memoranda. Then,
I reviewed preliminary agreement cases in jurisdictions with high volumes of
complex business litigation. Finally, I conducted a series of interviews with
practicing deal lawyers. Each method of inquiry is described in more depth
below.
A. Practitioners’ Literature Survey
Law firms with corporate practices often publish client alerts and
memoranda. In the ten years that it took the SIGA cases to wind its way
through the Delaware courts, for instance, many practitioners issued alerts
and memoranda to update their clients on the results of the case. Because
practitioners publish this literature in order to generate business, these alerts
do not stop at analysis of the case: They also include high-level opinions and
advice about how a case will shape the legal landscape, or how a case should
inform practices and norms going forward.
This practitioners’ literature is often overlooked as a research source, but
is in fact a rich source of information. In the case of preliminary agreements,
practitioners’ literature provides a reasonable proxy for large-scale survey or
interview data. To survey the practitioners’ literature on preliminary
agreements, this Article relied primarily on the digital archives of the
Bloomberg database, which attempts a comprehensive collection of
practitioners’ literature. In addition, a general search of practitioners’
literature was conducted. This yielded results from, for instance, the Harvard
Corporate Governance Law Forum and the law firm Fried Frank’s analysis
137.
See A.B.A., Rep. of the Committee on Comm. & Bus. Litig., at 1 (Winter 2007),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/newsletter_gratis/commercial_business
_litigation.pdf (“Most civil lawsuits settle.”).
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archives, both of which are oft-cited and respected sources for practitioners
and academics alike.
B.

Litigation Survey

A comprehensive survey was conducted of litigation in all state and
federal courts in New York and Delaware relating to preliminary agreement
dispute in business transactions. This Article focused on New York and
Delaware because of the relatively high number of business disputes between
sophisticated parties that are litigated in those forums. The survey of these
cases found that there were only 21 opinions published between the ten-year
period from June of 1996 to June of 2006. This is a very small number
compared to the overall volume of private M&A deals. While the exact
number of private M&A deals is hard to count—precisely because they are
private, and therefore not always disclosed—overall deal volume provides a
rough benchmark. In 2014—one of the years surveyed—companies
announced 9,802 deals.138 Another survey suggests that in the last month of
2016—just outside of the surveyed timeframe —106 private equity deals were
announced.139 The very small number of opinions during the surveyed period
supports interviewees’ accounts that very few preliminary agreements are
disputed, and those that are disputed are very rarely litigated to opinion.
C.

Interviews

At the heart of this Article are the original interviews. Preliminary
agreements are used in private M&A deals, where the terms of the deals and
the preliminary agreements are not disclosed to the public. Moreover,
preliminary agreements are rarely litigated, so information about preliminary
138.
M&A Trends Report 2015, DELOITTE at 4 (Mar. 2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/au/Documents/mergersacqisitions/deloitte-au-ma-2015-trends-240415.pdf (“In 2014, merger and acquisition activity
accelerated meaningfully with those factors well entrenched. The number of deals in the U.S.
rose 10 percent to 9,802.”).
139.
U.S. M&A News and Trends, FACTSET: FLASHWIRE US MONTHLY, at 1 (Jan.
2017), https://insight.factset.com [https://perma.cc/2HQG-8LTD] (“U.S. private equity
activity decreased in December, down 2.8% from November. There were 106 deals in
December compared to 109 in November.”). While not all private equity deals are private,
many are. In the absence of data on the number of private deals, data on private equity deals,
like data on overall deal volume, provides a benchmark that shows that 21 cases is a very
small fraction of deals.
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agreements cannot be found in opinions or filings. Original interviews are
the best source for understanding this common deal practice.
Interviews were conducted with twelve deal lawyers who have substantial
M&A practices. Most of the deal lawyers interviewed were trained in and
practiced in New York or California, although a few interviewees were trained
in or practiced in Virginia, Texas, or Illinois. Seven of the interviewed deal
lawyers had more than 20 years of experience advising M&A clients. The
interviewee with the fewest years of experience—seven—primarily advises
clients on private M&A deals, which is the most relevant type of M&A deals
for a study of preliminary agreements. All interviews were conducted by
telephone, on a confidential basis, on the dates indicated. All interviewees are
attorneys whose primary practices are M&A, or who had many years M&A
experience before moving into general corporate or hybrid M&A/business
roles in-house. All interviewees practiced at or were trained at Vault 50 firms.
For brevity and anonymity, each attorney is identified within the text of the
Article by reference to a reference term, which is noted below.

Date
May 7, 2016
May 17, 2016
May 26, 2016
May 26, 2016
May 31, 2016
June 2, 2016
June 15, 2016
June 13, 2016
June 20, 2016
May 23, 2016

Interviewee
New York Attorney Interviews
Recently retired from top legal position at investment
bank; previously M&A partner in New York; 25+ years of
experience
Senior M&A associate with experience in New York and
Chicago; 12+ years of experience
Senior M&A associate in New York; 15+ years of
experience
Senior M&A associate in New York; 7+ years of
experience
Silicon Valley Attorney Interviews
M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 20+ years of experience
M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 25+ years of experience
M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 25+ years of experience
M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 25+ years of experience
M&A partner in Silicon Valley; 25+ years of experience
In-House Attorney Interviews
In-house counsel at Silicon Valley company; previously
M&A attorney practicing in Silicon Valley and Virginia;
10+ years of experience

Reference Term
NY Firm Attorney I
NY Firm Attorney II
NY Firm Attorney III
NY Firm Attorney IV
SV Firm Attorney I
SV Firm Attorney II
SV Firm Attorney III
SV Firm Attorney IV
SV Firm Attorney V
In-House Attorney I
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In-house counsel at Texas company; previously senior
corporate associate practicing in Texas (firms in in-house);
20+ years of experience
In-house counsel at Silicon Valley company; previously
senior M&A associate at Silicon Valley firm; 10+ years of
experience

50

In-House Attorney II
In-House Attorney III

